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This paper analyses the relationship among competition law and the various sectoral 
regulatory regimes making up the EU body of economic regulation, at the systemic, 
substantive and institutional level. In the light thereof and of experience with 
comparable tools in other jurisdictions, we make recommendations regarding the 
interplay between the envisaged New Competition Tool (NCT) and sector-specific 
regulation. In our opinion, the proposed NCT could easily be integrated in the existing 
body of EU economic regulation. At the systemic level, the NCT should have a 
horizontal scope and hence be applicable to regulated sectors, since the NCT could 
usefully close eventual regulatory gaps. At the substantive level, the NCT should rest 
on economic knowledge and methodology, in line with existing EU economic 
regulation, yet without being straitjacketed within specific competition law analysis. At 
the institutional level, a close transversal cooperation between the Commission (or 
any authority implementing the NCT) and the relevant NRA(s) is needed at every 
stage of NCT implementation, if and when the NCT is applied in regulated sectors. 
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This paper sets out our recommendations on the interplay between the envisaged New 
Competition Tool (NCT) and existing EU sector-specific regulation.  
Our recommendations are based on an analysis of current EU economic regulation. We 
show that the different components of EU economic regulation (competition 
law and sectoral regulatory regimes) often overlap. They stand in a 
complementary relationship to each other. They all are meant to pursue the 
overall objectives of the EU Treaties but with different means, each of them focusing 
on its particular strengths. At the substantive level, competition law and sectoral 
regulation share a common theoretical basis and typically follow a public interest 
approach. They also share a common methodology, based on economic analysis and 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. At the institutional 
level, both competition law and sectoral regulatory regimes are implemented and 
enforced by a complex set of EU and national institutions: the European Commission, 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs), National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), EU-
level networks, with national and European courts playing a role as well. Coordination 
mechanisms are in place to cover horizontal (between national authorities), vertical 
(between the European and national levels) and transversal (across regulatory 
regimes) relationships. The success of the overall system depends mostly on a smooth 
coordination between the different institutions. 
On the basis of our analysis and the experiences of other jurisdictions already having 
an NCT equivalent, we conclude that the proposed NCT could easily be integrated 
in the existing body of EU economic regulation. At the systemic level, we think 
that the NCT should have a horizontal scope and apply across the board to the 
whole economy, including regulated sectors, as the NCT could usefully close 
eventual regulatory gaps. Such gaps could arise because a Structural Competition 
Problem (SCP) occurs so infrequently that regulatory intervention has been deemed 
too costly for the benefits it would bring, or because, as a matter of regulatory 
dynamics, the SCP in question is a new occurrence that has not yet been 
acknowledged and identified by sector-specific regulation. 
At the substantive level, we recommend that the NCT should rest on the same 
theoretical basis and methodology as existing EU economic regulation. 
However, the NCT should not be straitjacketed within specific competition law 
methodology (including relevant market definition and assessment of the relevant 
market in the light of the provision at stake), as long as solid economics underpin its 
implementation, including a theory of harm in individual cases. This does necessarily 
imply an increase in the discretion of the authority in charge of the NCT, but rather  
reliance on an economic methodology which is better adapted to the SCPs that the 
NCT is aimed to address. We also recommend that the NCT should be formulated in 
technology-neutral terms, i.e. using economic or functional concepts. Finally, we think 
that the fundamental elements of the NCT should be set out in legislation, and the role 
of soft-law – if any – should be limited to developing or elaborating on these 
fundamentals. 
At the institutional level, we suggest that NCT implementation and enforcement be 
embedded within the institutional framework for coordination under Regulation 
1/2003, to ensure proper coordination with competition authorities. Furthermore, if 




and when the NCT is applied in regulated sectors, we recommend a close 
transversal cooperation between the Commission (or any institution in 
charge of the NCT) and the relevant NRA(s) (or other regulatory authority) at 
every stage of the NCT implementation. (i) At the initiation stage, NRAs should be 
able to make an NCT reference when they cannot deal with a SCP in their sector 
because of the existence of a regulatory gap, as defined above. (ii) At the information 
gathering stage, the Commission and NRAs should be able to exchange confidential 
information provided, confidentiality is respected at both ends of the exchange. (iii) At 
the SCP identification and remedy design stages, the NRAs (and relevant EU-level 
networks) should be able to issue an opinion on draft Commission decisions, and the 
Commission should be bound to take the utmost account of such opinion. (iv) At the 
remedy implementation phase, the Commission should be able to impose remedies 
when the NRAs cannot act. However, if the NRAs are able to act (hence the NCT 
investigation shows that there is no regulatory gap in the end), then the Commission 
should make recommendations for action, of which the NRAs should take utmost 
account. (v) Finally, at the remedy monitoring stage, the Commission may delegate to 
the NRAs the compliance monitoring as well as the evaluation of the remedy.  
Given these coordination mechanisms, the potential for divergence between the NCT 
and sectoral regulation is minimized. In any event, we would recommend that the 
NCT and sectoral regulation apply concurrently, except in the rare case where a 
firm would be put in a position where it could not comply with one without breaching 
the other, in which case an EU-level remedy under the NCT should prevail over a 









1. Scope and aim of the paper 
This paper, which has been written for the European Commission, aims to analyse and 
make recommendations on the interplay between the envisaged New Competition Tool 
(NCT) and existing sector-specific regulation originating from the EU and aiming to 
address structural market failures. To do so, the paper is structured as follows. After 
this introduction, Section 2 deals with the characteristics of the main legal tools 
composing EU economic regulation, i.e. standard competition law and sectoral 
regulation, together with the proposed NCT. Then Section 3 deals with the existing 
relationships and interface between standard competition law and sectoral regulation 
at the systemic, substantive and institutional levels. Such analysis then leads us, in 
Section 4, to make concrete policy recommendations to ensure an effective 
complementarity between the proposed NCT and existing sectoral regulation.  
2. Characteristics of the main legal tools of EU economic regulation 
Next to competition law, EU economic regulation includes a number of more specific 
regulatory regimes, which are briefly reviewed below, in order to be able to situate the 
New Competition Tool. 
2.1. Competition law 
(a) Systemic and substantive issues: scope, trigger for intervention and remedies 
The regime of competition law in the European Union is well known; we will briefly 
survey its main relevant features for the purposes of this paper. For the sake of 
brevity, this section remains general and does not go into every detail. 
While discussion remains open on this issue, it is safe to say that the objectives of 
competition law include consumer welfare and the protection of the competitive 
process. EU competition law, as it applies to firms, comprises three main 
components: (i) a prohibition against restrictive agreements and concerted practices, 
at Article 101(1) TFEU, coupled with an exemption clause at 101(3) TFEU; (ii) a 
prohibition against abuses of dominant position, at Article 102 TFEU; (iii) prior review 
of concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) having an EU dimension, pursuant to 
Regulation 139/2004 (commonly known as the EU Merger Control Regulation or 
EMCR).1 
These three components are all couched in fairly general legislative provisions, which 
are applied in individual cases following a largely common methodology. First, 
relevant markets are defined, followed by market assessment (in the light of the 
specifics of each component) and the imposition of appropriate remedies, if necessary. 
The remedial arsenal of competition law includes fines, damages, nullity of 
agreements in breach of Article 101 TFEU, prohibition of mergers that run afoul of the 
EMCR, as well as a wide range of behavioural or even structural obligations to remove 
or prevent infringements of the law or to restore competition.  
(b) Institutional issues 
                                           
1 Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
O.J. [2004] L 25/1. 




The enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is detailed in Regulation 1/2003.2 
Enforcement powers are shared between the European Commission and the 
respective National Competition Authority (NCA) of each Member State. In addition, 
the respective competent court(s) in each Member State are competent to apply those 
provisions as original jurisdictions; they are also in charge of judicial review of NCA 
decisions (with the possibility of reference to the CJEU), whereas European courts 
entertain appeals from Commission decisions. The EMCR is enforced by the European 
Commission alone, with appeal to European courts. 
Member States also have national competition laws along broadly convergent lines 
to EU competition law, which are enforced by the NCA and national courts. Regulation 
1/2003 contains a number of rules on the interplay between EU and national 
competition laws (reconciliation rules and rules on applicable law). It also includes 
coordination mechanisms between the categories of authorities involved in EU 
competition law enforcement, including consultation, coordination, case allocation and 
the creation of a European Competition Network (ECN) of authorities.3 The scope and 
need for coordination under the MCR are less, given the mutually exclusive scope of 
EU and national laws. Mechanisms are in place for the transfer of cases from the EU to 
the national level, and vice versa. Under Regulation 1/2003 as well as under the MCR, 
Member States are involved in Commission decision-making through advisory 
committees (Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
Advisory Committee on Concentrations). 
2.2. Sectoral regulation 
(a) Systemic and substantive issues: scope, trigger for intervention and remedies 
Next to competition law, EU economic regulation features a number of more specific 
regimes, usually dealing with a single economic sector. While more specific in scope, 
these regimes often cover a broader range of concerns than the three components of 
competition law listed above. Dunne (2015:40) defines economic regulation as: ‘any 
State-imposed, positive, coercive alteration of – or derogation from – the operation of 
the free market in a sector, typically undertaken in order to correct market defects of 
an economic nature, and to be distinguished from regulation that pursues a 
predominantly social aim’. 
Specific regulation is usually adopted and tailored to correct perceived 
market failures in part of the economy.4 Market failures can have different causes, 
and economic literature on this point is constantly evolving. The main ones are market 
power, externalities, asymmetry of information and coordination issues.5 Whereas 
competition law is mostly concerned with market failures on the supply side 
(coordination of competitive behaviour, dominance), specific regulation often extends 
to both supply-side and demand-side failures. In addition, one could argue for an even 
broader definition of EU economic regulation, which would also include general 
                                           
2 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1, as amended. 
3 For constitutional reasons, coordination mechanisms as between the Commission and NCAs are better 
developed and stronger than between the Commission and national courts. 
4 This paper will not venture into the fundamental issue of the normative benchmark for market failure, 
which can be either a “purely economic” concept such as efficiency or welfare, or a more political benchmark 
established by reference to public policy objectives. 







regimes dealing with demand-side failures, i.e. consumer protection rules. As will be 
seen below, there is no theoretical incompatibility in so doing. In terms of 
methodology, remedies and institutions, these general demand-side regimes tend to 
resemble sector-specific regulation rather than competition law. 
Specific regulation tends to be formulated in more detailed provisions than 
competition law, and accordingly implementation and enforcement is often more 
focused on narrow issues. In so doing, authorities typically rely on economic 
knowledge and analysis in applying provisions that result from the economic 
assessment made by the legislative authority. 
Amongst sector-specific regulation, EU electronic communications regulation 
stands out though its regime of asymmetric regulation for providers with Significant 
Market Power (SMP). The SMP regime features a more developed methodology, which 
leans more clearly on competition law. This regime aims to regulate providers that 
hold SMP (interpreted as equivalent to dominance) on selected relevant markets, 
defined according to competition law methods. Relevant markets are selected if they 
meet the so-called “three-criteria test”: 6 
(i) high and non-transitory structural, legal or regulatory barriers to entry 
are present, 
(ii) there is a market structure which does not tend towards effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon, having regard to the state 
of infrastructure-based competition and other sources of competition 
behind the barriers to entry, 
(iii) competition law alone is insufficient to adequately address the identified 
market failure(s). This third criterion has been clarified by the 
Commission in the following way: ‘Competition law interventions are 
likely to be insufficient where for instance the compliance requirements 
of an intervention to redress persistent market failure(s) are extensive 
or where frequent and/or timely intervention is indispensable. Thus, ex 
ante regulation should be considered an appropriate complement to 
competition law when competition law alone would not adequately 
address persistent market failure(s) identified’.7 
Most other EU economic regulation regimes are not based on competition law 
methodology, since they respond to market failures – and may pursue economic policy 
objectives – that are different from those of competition law. This is the case for the 
other elements of EU electronic communications regulation, such as the symmetric 
obligations which can be imposed to all electronic communications providers 
independently of their market power or the universal service provisions.  
The remedial arsenal of specific regulatory regimes, in comparison to competition 
law, tends not to rely on fines, but rather on the imposition of (mostly) behavioural 
obligations, on wholesale or retail markets. Wholesale obligations range from non-
discrimination to price regulation, and include all forms of separation/unbundling as 
                                           
6 Directive 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code [hereinafter EECC], OJ [2018] L 321/36, Article 67(1). 
7 Commission Recommendation 2014/710 of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within 
the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2014] L 295/79, recital 16. 




well as wholesale access and service provision. Retail obligations include prudential 
obligations, consumer protection requirements or universal service obligations. 
(b) Institutional issues 
While, next to NCAs, the Commission can directly enforce EU competition law (which is 
exceptional in the broader context of EU law), EU economic regulation is usually 
enforced by Member States. Most regimes require Member States to set up a 
dedicated National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for implementation and enforcement. 
Given the importance of applying economic regulation effectively and in a non-
discriminatory manner across the internal market, EU law generally sets strict 
requirements for those NRAs – in particular in terms of independence, accountability, 
expertise, procedural safeguards and remedial powers8 – compliance with which is 
strictly enforced by the Court of Justice.9 
In order to guarantee the consistent application of EU law and some measure of 
coordination between NRAs, EU sectoral regulation regimes often establish an EU-
level forum for NRAs, in the form of a network, an agency or other. 10  In general, the 
Commission plays a very active role in those networks. Moreover, in some cases, NRA 
decision are subject to review or even veto at the European level by the Commission 
or the EU-level forum. 
Exceptionally, EU economic regulation can be enforced directly by EU-level agencies or 
bodies. This is the case in particular for the financial supervision of the systemic 
banks, which are supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism at the ECB.11 In 
other sectors, the EU agency comprising the network of NRAs may also have direct, 
but limited, enforcement powers on matters having cross-border dimensions,12 cross-
border externalities or a strong internal market dimension.13 
2.3. Proposals for a New Competition Tool 
                                           
8 EECC, Art. 6-9; Directive 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity [2019] OJ 
[2019] L 158/125, Art. 57. It should be noted that the same requirements apply to NCAs as well: see 
Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, O.J. [2019] L 11/3. 
9 E.g. Case C–424/15 Ormaetxea Garai et al.  v Administración del Estado ECLI:EU:C:2016:780. 
10 For instance: Regulation 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
establishing the Body of the European Regulators for Electronic Communications, OJ [2018] L 321/1; 
Regulation 2019/942 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 establishing an 
European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, OJ [2019] L 158/22; Regulation 1095/2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), O.J. [2010] L 331/84, as amended. 
11 Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, O.J. [2013] L 287/63 setting 
the criteria for the systemic banks being supervised by the SSM: (i) the size - total value of its assets 
exceeds € 30 billion; (ii) the economic importance for the specific Member State or the EU economy as a 
whole; (iii) the size of the cross-border activities - the total value of its assets exceeds €5 billion and the 
ratio of its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating Member State to its total 
assets/liabilities is above 20%; or (iv) the direct public financial assistance when the bank has requested or 
received funding from the European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility.  
12 See the powers conferred upon ACER throughout Regulation 2019/943 on the internal market for 
electricity. 
13 See in particular the power of ESMA to supervise and fine credit rating agencies. Article 28 of Regulation 
236/2012 which regulates short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps gives the ESMA the 
power to intervene through legally binding acts in the financial markets of Member States if there is a 
‘threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the stability of the whole or part of 
the financial system in the Union’. This power has been validated by the Court of Justice in Case C-270/12 







(a) Systemic and substantive issues: scope, trigger for intervention and remedies 
According to the Inception Impact Assessment of the Commission services,14 the NCT 
will address: 
(i) certain Structural Competition Problems (SCP) due to problematic 
market features; 
(ii) that have adverse consequences on competition and may ultimately result 
in inefficient market outcomes in terms of higher prices, lower quality, less 
choice and innovation; 
(iii) and that standard competition law tools – i.e. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
and the related sector enquiry mechanism under Regulation 1/200315- 
cannot tackle or cannot address in the most effective manner. Examples of 
the former are exclusionary strategies by non-dominant firms with market 
power. Examples of the latter are parallel leveraging strategies by dominant 
firms into multiple adjacent markets. 
The Inception Impact Assessment groups those SCP into two categories depending on 
whether harm is about to affect or has already affected the market.16 
First, structural risks for competition occur where certain market features – such 
as network and scale effects, lack of multi-homing and lock-in effects – and the 
conduct of the firms operating in the markets concerned create a threat for 
competition. This applies to: (i) tipping markets, where risks for competition can arise 
through the creation of powerful market players with an entrenched market and/or 
gatekeeper position, which could have been prevented by early intervention; and (ii) 
unilateral strategies by non-dominant firms to monopolise a market through anti-
competitive means.  
Second, a structural lack of competition happens when a market is not working 
well and not delivering competitive outcomes due to its structure (i.e. a structural 
market failure). These include: (i) markets displaying systemic failures – going beyond 
the conduct of a particular firm with market power – due to certain structural features, 
such as high concentration and entry barriers, consumer lock-in, lack of access to data 
or data accumulation; and (ii) Oligopolistic market structures with an increased risk 
for tacit collusion, including markets featuring increased transparency due to 
algorithm-based technological solutions.  
To tackle those SCP and the related market features, the Inception Impact 
Assessment envisages four different options depending on: 
- the scope of the NCT: whether the NCT would apply horizontally to all sectors 
of the economy, as it is the case for standard competition rules, or be limited 
to certain sectors, in particular the digital or digitally-enabled markets; 
- the basis of intervention: whether the NCT would apply to all cases of SCP (and 
potentially to all firms in those markets) or be limited to dominant firms as it is 
the case under Article 102 TFEU (but without having to prove abuse). 
The different options are presented in the Table 1 below, the broadest option being 
option 3 while the narrowest is option 2. 
                                           
14 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-rulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12416-New-competition-tool 
15 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 17. 
16 See Motta and Peitz (2020) for some proposals on triggers and theories of harm for the NCT. 




Table 1: The different options for the NCT 
 Horizontal Sectoral 
(e.g. digital) 
Structure-based 
(e.g. tipping or oligopolistic 
markets) 
Option 3 Option 4 
Dominance-based 
(but without requirement to show 
abuse) 
Option 1 Option 2 
 
All policy options of the Inception Impact Assessment would empower the Commission 
to impose different types of remedies. They may consist in imposing on firms certain 
obligations which may be structural, non-structural or hybrid. Since the issues 
underlying SCP are not imputable to any particular firm, there is no finding of 
infringement, nor are fines imposed on firms.   
Beyond those remedies, the NCT could also lead to: (i) recommendations to 
legislatures, which could bring the NCT close to the existing sector enquiry under 
competition law, as these sector enquiries are often followed by legislative proposals 
from the Commission to the EU legislative bodies;17 (ii) recommendations to sectoral 
regulators; (iii) non-binding recommendations to firms, for instance in form of code of 
conducts; (iv) voluntary commitments made by firms. 
(b) Institutional issues 
At the institutional level, the NCT would be enforced by the Commission. A possible 
setting would be that DG COMP does the analysis and the College of Commissioners 
adopts the decision.18 As for any Commission decision, the Commission services and 
DGs would closely cooperate in preparing the decision through an inter-service 
steering group and a formal Inter-Service Consultation and the College decisions are 
adopted under the principle of collegiality. 19 This implies that any DG in charge of a 
specific economic sector and the accompanying sector-specific regulation would be 
closely associated in any NCT proceedings and decisions. 
2.4. Comparison between the main legal tools of EU economic regulation 
Table 2 below compares the main general characteristics of current EU competition 
law, a possible New Competition Tool as explained in the Inception Impact Assessment 
and sector-specific regulation.20 
  
                                           
17 Report from the Commission of 10 May 2017, E-Commerce Sector Inquiry, COM(2017) 229 and 
Regulation 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing 
unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on consumers’ nationality, place of 
residence or place of establishment within the internal market OJ [2018] L 60I/1. 
18 As suggested by Schweitzer (2020), 
19 Commission Decision 2010/138 of 24 February 2010 amending its Rules of Procedure, arts. 1 and 23. 
20 For a detailed comparison of the features of competition law and sectoral economic regulation see Carlton 







Table 2: Comparison between EU economic regulation legal tools 
 




















Firm conduct / 
Merger 
Market failures/  
Market features 




to individual cases 









TBD General economic 
analysis22 
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- Private damages 
- Obligations:  
Behavioural and 
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- MCR: Commission 
alone 
TBD NRAs  
Exceptionally, EU-level 
authorities 
Coordination - Consultation, case 





TBD - Consultation, review 
(even veto) of NRA 
draft decisions 
- EU-level forum 
(network, agency) 
 
Such comparison shows that the NCT is likely to share many features with the rest of 
EU competition law, and other features with sectoral regulation.  
3. Existing interplay between competition law and sector specific 
regulation 
An NCT along the lines of the features described above will therefore be introduced 
into a well-populated landscape of legal regimes of economic governance in the EU. 
                                           
21 For instance, the EECC, Art. 3(2), indicated four objectives (connectivity to very high capacity networks, 
effective competition, internal market and citizens interests) that should be balanced by the NRAs. 
22 Except for the SMP regime in electronic communications, which tracks competition law methods more 
closely. 




Accordingly, its relationship with the existing legal regimes must be carefully 
considered. Indeed, in its response to the public consultation, BEREC points to the 
risks that: “a conflict between Electronic Communications Services regulation and the 
NCT could result in inconsistent application of ex-ante regulation, forum shopping by 
market actors and potential regulatory uncertainty on whom, how and under which 
circumstances a market actor is subject to regulation. This legal uncertainty could 
have serious implications for investment in a dynamic and competitive sector”.23 
In order to structure the analysis of the relationship between the NCT and existing EU 
economic regulation, we will distinguish between three aspects thereof: 
- The systemic relationship between the NCT as an instrument and other existing 
clusters or units of economic governance – including consumer protection law – 
i.e. boundary and hierarchy issues as between these regimes;  
- The substantive relationship, as concerns the respective substance and 
methodology of these regimes; 
- The institutional relationship, as between the institutions who are in charge of 
implementing, interpreting and enforcing these regimes.  
In this section, we provide a survey of the state of the law and of existing options 
regarding the three aspects of the relationship between various regimes of economic 
regulation, by way of background to our analysis of how the NCT would fit into that 
landscape that will be developed in the next section. 
3.1. Systemic relationship: Complementarity between economic regulation 
regimes 
In the wake of the substantial expansion of sector-specific regulation at EU level from 
the mid-1980s onward, as a result of harmonization and liberalization efforts to 
achieve the Single Market, the systemic relationship between these regulatory clusters 
came to the fore, and in particular the relationship between competition law and 
sectoral regulation. Practitioners and academics alike sometimes conceive of 
competition law and sector-specific regulation as substitutes or alternatives: each of 
them would have its domain, exclusive of the other.24 Under this view, the main 
challenge would then be to properly classify concrete issues and disputes as pertaining 
to one or the other. Quite conceivably, this view is influenced by US law, where 
regulation has been seen as a substitute to antitrust law, and where leading case-law 
tends to consider antitrust and regulation as exclusive of one another.25 
Yet both a theoretical analysis of EU law and the weight of practice and case-law point 
to the opposite direction: in the EU, competition law and sectoral regulation 
should be seen as complements which pursue similar objectives but with 
                                           
23 BEREC Response to the Public Consultations on the Digital Services Act Package and the New Competition 
Tool, BoR(20) 138, p.37. 
24 This was a prominent feature in the discussions around the future of sectoral regulation, and it linked with 
the sometimes excessive use of the ex ante vs ex post distinction, especially by economists: see for 
instance Bourreau and Dogan (2001) or Newbery (2004). On the legal side, see Breyer (1982) at 156-161. 
25 Shelanski (2011) chronicles and criticizes the two leading US cases on point, Verizon Communications v. 
Trinko 540 US 398 (2004) and Credit Suisse v. Billing 551 US 264 (2007). See also OECD (2011). Note that 
a nuanced reading of Trinko reveals that, in order to conclude that the application of antitrust law is 
excluded, the US Supreme Court is careful to point out that the prior regulatory process “fulfilled the 







different means, each of the two focusing on its particular strength.26 To the 
extent it is at all useful to try to delineate their respective domains, these domains 
overlap. Hence cases will arise where both are applicable, and coordination 
mechanisms will be necessary. 
The theoretical analysis is based on the architecture of EU law. Ultimately, all 
instruments of EU law are meant to pursue the overall objectives listed at Article 3 
TEU (and Protocol 27), including, for the legal instruments concerned by the present 
paper, the establishment of an internal market where competition is not distorted. 
These objectives inform the main provisions of primary EU law, such as Articles 101 or 
102 TFEU (which establish the competition rules) or Articles 34, 45, 49, 56, 63 (which 
establish the four freedoms of movement) as well as the corresponding legal bases 
used to enact secondary law (regulations, directives), including Articles 103, 114 or 
352 TFEU which have been used for competition law and internal market law. 
Secondary law based on these legal bases is meant to contribute to the realisation of 
those overarching objectives. In other words, the architecture of EU law connects all 
these regimes and subsumes them under common objectives. It is accordingly not 
only possible, but even preferable to conceive of them as components of a coherent 
whole, i.e. an EU body of economic regulation. 
Hence, over the years, it has become customary to refer to competition law as a 
general, across-the-board component of that body of economic regulation, next to 
which a number of specific regulatory regimes are concerned with specific sectors or 
issues.27 General competition law and specific regulation then go hand in hand as 
complements (and not substitutes or alternatives). Specific regulation contributes to 
achieving the overall objectives of EU economic regulation by dealing with questions 
that either lie outside the purview of general competition law because competition law 
was not conceived to deal with them, or are recurrent systemic issues for which 
competition law is not the most effective instrument. Overlaps between competition 
law and specific regulation are therefore unavoidable. 
The practice of the last decades bears witness to these overlaps and to the 
complementarity between economic regulation regimes. Electronic 
communications regulation offers many instances. The 1998 Access Notice already 
detailed the interplay between competition law and sector-specific regulation in the 
emerging competition practice of the 1990s.28 In the 2000s, a string of high-profile 
refusal to deal and margin squeeze cases29 further highlighted the relationship 
between competition law and sector-specific regulation. Examples come from other 
sectors as well. In the postal sector, the liberalization of cross-border mail services 
came through the application of Postal Services Directive and competition law.30 In the 
energy sector, enforcement of Article 102 TFEU against the major network operators 
                                           
26 See also Dunne (2015) and Hellwig (2005). This is also the view of some US authors like Carlton and 
Picker (2007) noting that: “Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation 
and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative 
strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do”. 
27 Larouche (2000). 
28 Commission Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector, O.J. [1998] C 265/2. 
29 Case C-280/08P Deutsche Telekom v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603; Case C-52/9 Konkurrensverket 
v. TeliaSonera ECLI:EU:C:2011:83; Case C-295/12P Telefonica v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062. 
30 Directive 97/67 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for 
the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of 
service, OJ [1997] L 15/14, as amended; Geradin (2006).  




gave a decisive impetus to the unbundling of networks (transmission and distribution) 
from production, as provided in the sectoral directives.31 In the financial sector as 
well, the realisation of the internal market in insurance was a result of the interaction 
between competition law and sectoral directives.32 In all of these examples, the 
existence of an overlap between competition law and sectoral regulation was 
acknowledged and accepted. That overlap is the very foundation for the 
complementary interplay between these regimes that led to successful outcomes 
(from the point of view of the overarching EU objectives).  
For the purposes of this paper, this EU body of economic regulation can be deemed to 
include demand-side regulation as well, dealing with consumer protection or data 
protection (in particular the GDPR).33 Indeed consumer protection is primarily dealt 
with through secondary legislation based on Article 114 and 169 TFEU, thereby linking 
with the general objectives of Article 3 TEU as they relate to the functioning of the 
economy. Furthermore, a number of the sector-specific regulatory regimes, such as 
those in network industries, the financial sector, the audio-visual sector and e-
commerce, span both supply- and demand-side regulation.   
  
                                           
31 Now: Directive 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules 
for the internal market for electricity OJ [2019] L 158/125. See Hancher and Larouche (2011). 
32 As best exemplified in the role played by the sectoral block exemption, lately Regulation 267/2010, OJ 
[2010] L 83/1 (now expired), in charting a balance between the liberalization of the sector and the need for 
insurance firms to cooperate on certain aspects of their operations.  











3.2. Substantive relationship 
If the various regimes of EU economic regulation are complements within a larger 
body of law, with some overlap between them, their respective substantive rules 
should be compatible, if not aligned. 
Indeed the starting point is that all of these regimes share a common 
theoretical basis and methodology. With respect to theory, EU economic 
regulation typically follows a public interest approach: public authorities stand at some 
distance from markets and society, they observe the operation of markets and act in 
the public interest in order to remedy or correct market failures. Compared to the 
USA, public choice theory plays a less important role. Government failure is of more 
limited concern: it is assumed that the EU multi-level institutional setting is less 
vulnerable to capture and other government failures.34 EU economic regulation is 
content with traditional safeguards such as judicial review, reporting obligations, or 
periodical assessments and reviews.  
This theoretical basis is reflected in the methodology used to develop and review 
regulation, which is derived from the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.35 
That methodology is set out in the Better Regulation Guidelines, especially in the 
chapter on Impact Assessment.36 In the case of EU economic regulation, the 
methodology incorporates the use of economic analysis, in the development of 
regulation and, to the extent necessary, in its implementation and enforcement as 
                                           
34 On the different positive and normative explanations of regulation, including public interest and public 
choice theories, see Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012); Viscusi, Harrington and Shappington (2018). 
35 TUE, Art. 5 and Protocol No. 2.   
36 European Commission Staff Working Document of 7 July 2017, Better Regulation Guidelines 
SWD(2017)350, Chapter III.  




well. In other words, economic regulation relies on recognized economic knowledge, 
from fields such as industrial organization, institutional economics, political economy, 
game theory or behavioural economics, to name but the main ones. 
In principle, the substance of the NCT, as a general regime of economic regulation, 
should fit within the theoretical basis and methodology set out above. No significant 
difficulties should arise. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning a few substantive lessons 
arising from the experience with other economic regulation regimes, that could be 
useful in the elaboration of the NCT. 
First of all, there is limited value in methodological convergence going beyond 
the general commitment to rely on recognised economic knowledge, as set out 
just above. As mentioned earlier in this paper, in the course of developing the current 
regulatory framework for electronic communications in the early 2000s, EU institutions 
decided to rely on competition law methodology for a core element of the framework, 
the SMP regime. It was hoped that this would ensure coherency between electronic 
communications and competition law and boost the ease-of-use and legitimacy of 
sector-specific regulation. Market definition and market analysis (in order to ascertain 
if a player held SMP) were built into the regulatory process, ostensibly to reproduce 
competition law analysis. A good argument can be made that both market definition 
and SMP analysis never were done quite along the same lines as under competition 
law.37  
In any event, starting at the latest with the second Recommendation on relevant 
markets, in 2007,38 the exercise became mostly one of market selection, with the 
famous “three-criteria test” (explained above) becoming the main focus of discussion. 
The market selection made in the Commission Recommendation was so influential that 
the “competition law” analysis carried out by NRAs to define markets and then identify 
SMP operators on those markets receded in the background. The experience of 
electronic communications regulation with the introduction of competition law 
methodology is therefore at best inconclusive.39 On a more general note, Hellwig 
(2009) explains how the use of market definition (within the meaning of competition 
law) in sectoral regulation unduly prevents regulation from taking a more systemic 
view of the market failures and theories of harm. 
Secondly, the commitment to rely on recognised economic knowledge does however 
have some concrete implications for regulatory design. Here as well, electronic 
communications regulation provides a good illustration. The current regulatory 
framework rests on the principle of technological neutrality,40 which implies that 
the law must be framed so as to be sustainable in the face of technological change 
and evolution, and that it must avoid picking technological winners inadvertently.41 As 
a consequence, most of the central concepts of electronic communications law have 
been formulated in economic or functional terms, eschewing technological 
                                           
37 Hellwig (2009); Larouche (2002); de Streel (2008). 
38 Recommendation 2007/879 of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation [2007] OJ L 344/65. 
39 If the reliance on competition law methodologies proved inconclusive at the substantive level, such 
reliance serves an institutional purpose, namely to justify the Commission veto over NRAs draft decisions 
regarding market definition and SMP designation. 
40 EECC, art. 4(c). 







categories.42 This choice has stood the test of time. In comparison, regulatory 
frameworks that enshrine technological categories or models – such as the successive 
electricity directives – have proven more difficult to manage over time, with each 
round of legislative review leading to more regulation and increased complexity. 
Thirdly, since the early 2000s, with the reform of competition law and the electronic 
communications regulatory framework, the Commission relied mostly on soft-law 
instruments as the preferred vehicle to achieve coordination, whether 
substantive or procedural. These soft-law instruments include recommendations 
(within the meaning of Article 288 TFEU) as well as less official forms such as 
communications, notices and guidelines. The Commission chose soft-law instruments 
because of their informality and flexibility, given that they were meant for fellow 
regulatory or competition law authorities. In practice, these soft-law instruments were 
largely followed, but their formal legal force was questioned and tested by litigants in 
a number of court cases. Unfortunately, European courts weakened the approach of 
the Commission by  emphasizing the lack of binding effect of soft-law instruments 
upon courts and other authorities than the Commission itself.43  
Amongst these soft-law instruments, only recommendations have been given some 
effect, in that courts are bound “to take them into account in order to decide disputes 
submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the interpretation on national 
measures adopted in order to implement them or where they are designed to 
supplement binding Community provisions”.44 It took years for the Court to finally 
accept, in 2016, that soft-law – in this case a recommendation -  could impose some 
constraints on NRAs and reviewing courts, when the NRA was expressly required to 
“take utmost account” of it. For the NRA, “taking utmost account” implies following the 
recommendation, unless it finds that this is not appropriate, in which case the NRA 
must give reasons for its position.45  Upon review, a national court may depart from a 
recommendation only for reasons having to do with factual circumstances.46 
3.3. Institutional relationship 
(a) Overall picture 
When it comes to institutions, the relationship between regulatory regimes is 
multi-dimensional.47 Within each regime, there is typically a horizontal relationship 
                                           
42 Although the European Electronic Communications Code reintroduces some technology-based concepts 
with the notion of ‘very high capacity network’ at EECC, Art. 2(2). 
43 This can be observed in particular with respect to competition law, where the CJEU insisted upon the non-
binding nature of the De minimis notice (now at [2014] OJ C 291/1) (Case C-226/11 Expedia 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:795 at para. 4), the Notices on cooperation within the ECN [2004] OJ C101/43 and on 
leniency [2006] C 298/17 (Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer ECLI:EU:C:2011:389 at para.21), the Guidance paper 
on Article 102 TFEU [2009] OJ C45/7 (CJEU, 6 October 2015, Case C-23/14 Post Danmark I 
ECLI:EU:C;2015:651 at para. 52), the instruments produced by the ECN, especially the Model Leniency 
Programme (Case C-428/14, DHL Express (Italy) ECLI:EU:C:2016:27 at para. 41-44). The General Court 
also denied any binding nature to Commission comments issued under Art. 7(3) of Directive 2002/21 [now 
Art. 33(3) EECC]: Case T-109/96 Vodafone España ECLI:EU:T:2007:384 at para. 93. 
44 Case C-322/88  Salvatore Grimaldi ECLI:EU:C:1989:646 at para. 18, reconfirmed in the context of 
economic regulation in Case C–55/06, Arcor v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2008:244 at para. 94 
and Case C-28/15 KPN v. ACM ECLI:EU:C:2016:692 at para. 41. 
45 Case C-28/15 KPN v. ACM, at para. 38. This ruling is confirmed in Case C-277/16 Polkomtel v. UKE, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:989 at para. 37. The CJEU gives more effect to “utmost account” than the Gen Ct had 
previously done in Case T-109/96 Vodafone España, at para. 93. 
46 Case C-28/15 KPN v. ACM at para. 42-43, expanding upon existing case-law, as mentioned at para. 41.  
47 See Larouche (2004), Monti (2020). 




between the regulatory authorities of each Member State – in charge of implementing 
EU secondary law, as a default rule – as well as a vertical relationship between the 
Member State authorities and the European-level authority, usually the Commission. 
In addition, as between regimes, the respective authorities find themselves in a 
transversal relationship.  
The overall picture is quite complex: 
- At the apex of the pyramid, the European Commission plays a role in every EU 
economic regulation regime. In EU competition law, it holds direct 
implementation powers, shared with NCAs. Where national authorities are 
(also) in charge of implementation, the Commission is empowered – depending 
on the regime – to enact implementing or delegated legislation, to issue non-
binding coordination documents (recommendations, guidelines, etc.) or to 
review, veto or take over the work of national authorities. In addition, the 
Commission is always a member or observer in the European-level institutions 
regrouping national authorities;  
 
- At the bottom of the pyramid, each Member State created a national 
competition authority (NCA) as well as a number of national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) to handle the implementation and enforcement tasks arising 
from EU economic regulation.  
 
- Within each Member State, one or more courts are responsible for the judicial 
review of NRA and NCA decisions (or a similar mechanism of judicial control), 
and courts also hold original jurisdiction for the application of competition law. 
 
- Between the European Commission and the national authorities and courts, for 
each regime, the NCAs or NRAs, as the case may be, are regrouped in a 
European-level forum wherein they can – depending on the regime – exchange 
information, coordinate or allocate enforcement activity, develop best practice 
or issue recommendations or other soft-law instruments or in some cases even 
issue decisions. These European fora take various legal forms, and their size 
and powers vary. They include the European Competition Network (ECN), the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) or the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in the financial sector. 
(b) Horizontal and vertical coordination 
In each EU economic regulation regime, EU law typically provides for means of 
horizontal and vertical coordination between the relevant authorities 
concerned with that regime.48 It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe them 
in great detail. One prominent example is found at Regulation 1/2003, as regards 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. At Article 11, Regulation 1/2003 sets out a mechanism for 
cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs: they notify each other when 
proceedings are initiated and before they are closed, with a view of coordinating their 
action. Such coordination takes place within the European Competition Network 
                                           
48 On the need and types of institutional cooperation in shared regulatory spaces, see Freeman and Rossi 
(2012) and Monti (2020). On the practical form of inter-agencies cooperation, the International Competition 







(ECN).49 Ultimately, the Commission retains the power of taking cases away from an 
NCA (Article 11(6)), but that power has not been used so far, in view of the proper 
functioning of cooperation within the ECN.  
Another model is found in electronic communications, under the SMP regime:50 there 
NRAs communicate their draft SMP measures to one another and to the Commission, 
for consultation. Coordination takes place within BEREC, which can also comment on 
NRA draft measures. Ultimately, the Commission retains the power to object to a draft 
measure, and even veto it if it concerns market definition or SMP assessment. A small 
but non-insignificant number of veto decisions have been issued over the years.51 
The mechanisms described above are too detailed and probably too prescriptive to be 
applied to transversal relationships as between two different economic regulation 
regimes, if only because such regimes are contained in separate legal instruments. 
Indeed no comparable mechanisms exist as between two different regimes in 
EU law at the moment. Nonetheless, two features of these mechanisms could 
be useful in the design of what would be a more limited transversal coordination 
regime involving the NCT. 
First of all, the duty to consult is designed to be as effective as possible. 
Consultation takes place early in the process, for competition law, on the basis of a 
notice of intent to open an investigation, in order to avoid wasteful duplication of 
enforcement efforts.52 A second, more extensive round of consultation takes place 
towards the end of the proceedings, when the authority has reached the point in its 
work where it can table a draft decision or measure. The Commission and other 
authorities have all the information in hand to be able to give meaningful comments to 
the authority that tabled the draft, and that authority has time to take these 
comments into account. 
Secondly, one of the most interesting features of the SMP regime under the electronic 
communications framework is the obligation to “take utmost account”, which 
figures throughout Articles 32 and 33 EECC.53 NRAs must take utmost account of the 
objectives of the EECC.54 They must equally take utmost account of (i) comments 
received from other NRAs, BEREC or the Commission regarding a draft measure,55 (ii) 
a Commission notification that it entertains serious doubts regarding a draft 
measure.56 In return, the Commission is also bound to take utmost account of 
BEREC’s opinion before issuing a veto or a recommendation to an NRA.57 Similarly, 
NRAs must also take utmost account of Commission recommendations aiming to 
harmonize EECC implementation58. As mentioned above, in KPN v. ACM, the CJEU 
                                           
49 Save for consultations on draft Commission decisions, which take place through the Advisory Committee 
on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positiions : Regulation 1/2003, Art. 14(1). 
50 EECC, Art. 32-33. 
51 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/consultation-procedures-telecom 
52 Such a round of early consultation would be pointless under the EECC, since the NRAs are well aware of 
their respective enforcement agenda (being coordinated via the Commission Recommendation on relevant 
markets) and the risk of overlap is minimal. 
53 The notion of “taking utmost account” figures in many other places in the EECC, and indeed throughout 
EU law. However, it is in the context of Articles 32 and 33 EECC that it has received the most attention in 
practice and in academic work. 
54 EECC, art.32(1) 
55 EECC, art.32(8) and 33(1). 
56 EECC, art.33(4a). 
57 EECC, art.32(6) and 33(5). 
58 EECC, art.38(2). 




elaborated for the first time on the meaning of “taking utmost account”.59 It held that, 
in order to take utmost account of a Commission recommendation, an NRA is expected 
as a rule to follow the recommendation. The NRA can depart from the 
recommendation only if it finds the recommendation inappropriate in the 
circumstances of a given situation, and then the NRA must give reasons for its 
conclusion. In other words, “taking utmost account” would correspond to a strong 
“comply or explain” obligation. Even though the CJEU in KPN v. ACM formulated its 
reasoning in general terms, it remains to be seen whether “taking utmost account” will 
be interpreted similarly in other contexts. 
(c) Transversal coordination 
As mentioned above, as regards transversal relationships between authorities across 
regimes, EU law is much less developed. At a minimum, all authorities at EU and 
national level, in their capacity as actors in the implementation and 
enforcement of EU law, are under a duty of loyalty (sincere cooperation) towards 
one another, pursuant to Article 4 TEU. Such duty translates in an obligation to consult 
other authorities – usually between an NRA and the NCA – as explicitly stated in some 
EU regimes.60 But effective coordination often requires more than consultations. 
At the European level, some transversal coordination effort takes place 
internally, given that the Commission plays a role in every EU economic 
regulation regime. Such coordination is a matter for the internal rules and 
procedures of the Commission. In principle, internal coordination within a single 
institution – the European Commission – should happen without too much friction. The 
joint work of DG COMP and DG CNECT in the early years of the SMP regime provide a 
successful example of intra-Commission coordination. Coordination between the 
European-level regulatory fora is uneven: whereas in network industries the 
respective fora are perhaps too diverse to be able to coordinate effectively, the three 
financial-sector European Supervisory Authorities appear to be in closer contact, given 
their greater symmetry and their common design.  
If anything, the most interesting developments regarding transversal coordination 
occurred at Member State level. A number of innovative formulae have been 
deployed. By way of example, Italy and the UK have created NRAs spanning multiple 
regimes in the converging ICT sector (electronic communications and audiovisual 
media services), in order to regulate more effectively. Given commonalities and also 
out of efficiency concerns, Germany has bundled all network-industry NRAs into one 
(Bundesnetzagentur or BNetzA), as well as all financial sector NRAs into one 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or BaFin).61 In order to avoid frictions 
and forum shopping between competition law and sectoral regulation, the UK has 
given concurrent competition law powers to a number of NRAs in the network 
industries. Finally, Spain and the Netherlands have gone the furthest, merging the 
NCA with the NRAs in the network industries and the consumer protection authority, 
into a broad authority (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia or CNMC, 
Autoriteit for Consumenten en Markten or ACM). While these different formulas are 
                                           
59 here in the context of Article 38(2) EECC: supra, at para. 37-38. 
60 For instance, EECC, art.11. 
61 In the same vein, the UK has created a UK Regulators Network (UKRN) bringing together regulators in the 







attractive and worth studying,62 none of them appears feasible in the context of the 
relationship between the authorities in charge of implementing the NCT and other 
authorities tasked with the application of economic regulation,   
3.4. Reconciliation mechanism 
In the end, given the need for cooperation and coordination, a reconciliation 
mechanism must also be provided. Such a mechanism was at the heart of 
Deutsche Telekom,63 a case where the Commission found that DT had breached 
Article 102 TFEU by engaging into a margin squeeze as between its wholesale access 
prices and its retail tariffs, leaving competing retailers with limited, and sometimes 
even negative margins. One of DT’s main points in defence was that both its wholesale 
and retail prices had been approved by the German sectoral regulatory authority.64 
Following the Commission and the General Court, the CJEU held that Article 102 TFEU 
remained applicable even if the German regulatory authority had already dealt with 
the case, unless DT would have been positively compelled by the authority to act as it 
did (which it was not).65 The underlying message was clear: a firm remains subject to 
competition law for its course of conduct, even if such conduct would not fall foul of 
sectoral regulation. Competition law therefore prevails.66 In the subsequent Spain v. 
Commission case, a similar margin squeeze issue arose, with Spain arguing for the 
primacy of the decision taken by its sectoral authority. The General Court framed the 
issue more explicitly in terms of a reconciliation rule when it wrote at Rec. 55:67 
In any event, even if the sectoral regulation referred to by the Kingdom of 
Spain derives from European Union secondary legislation, it must be stated 
that, in view of the principles governing the hierarchical relationship of legal 
rules, such secondary legislation could not, in the absence of any enabling 
provision in the Treaty, derogate from a provision of the Treaty, in this case 
Article [102 TFEU]. 
The rule arising from Deutsche Telekom and Spain v. Commission therefore flows 
from the primacy of competition law (specifically Article 102 TFEU) – as 
primary EU law – over sectoral regulation, which is secondary EU law. This rule is 
useful whenever Articles 101 or 102 TFEU is involved. 
What about other situations where no hierarchical element is present, such as 
between two regimes of secondary law? Of course, the regimes in question could 
contain their own reconciliation rules, as is the case for instance with the EECC for 
                                           
62 See Alexiadis and Da Silva Pereira Neto (2019).  
63 Case C-280/08P Deutsche Telekom v. Commission. 
64 RegTP, as it then was. The corresponding regulatory powers are now vested in the BNetzA. 
65 Case COMP/37.451 Deutsche Telekom AG [2003] OJ L263/9, para. 54; Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom 
v. Commission [2008] ECLI:EU:T:2008:101, para. 85-88; Case C-280/08P, para. 80-90. 
66 The reverse situation, where a firm would comply with competition law but not with sectoral regulation, 
has not yet been explored in the case law. In the 1998 Access Notice, the Commission states that in such a 
case, compliance with competition law does not prevent liability under sectoral regulation. In practice, such 
cases are unlikely to arise: since the 2004 reform (Regulation 1/2003), the Commission has ceased to issue 
non-infringement decisions under Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, and national competition authorities do not 
have the power to issue such decisions. Unless a firm would somehow have obtained a court judgment on 
the issue, it will accordingly not be in a position where it can invoke an actual decision to support a claim 
that it complies with competition law, in the course of regulatory proceedings.   
67 Case T-398/07, Commission v. Spain ECLI:EU:T:2012:173. In the same Recital, the General Court 
explicitly dismissed Spain’s argument that Trinko was a relevant authority on this point.  




electronic communications.68 In the absence of such explicit rules, case-law on this 
point is not well established. Available principles of legislative interpretation could 
apply, but they do not carry the same strength as a hierarchical rule.  
In some situations, a general/specific articulation could be used. In such cases, 
the Court tries to apply both regimes in a complementary manner when that is 
possible. For instance, in the electronic communications sector, the Court of Justice 
clarified that the sector-specific consumer protection rules (now in the EECC) are 
complementary – and not substitute – to the general consumer protections rules. 
Therefore, those general consumer protection rules apply fully to the electronic 
communications sectors and should be enforced by the consumer protection 
authority.69 Otherwise, the more specific regime should apply first, but at the same 
time it should not apply so as to contradict the more general regime, unless the more 
specific regime explicitly deviates from the more general one. 
Another possibility would be a principal/accessory articulation. For instance, in 
UPC Nederland, the CJEU used and left aside the regime that only applied to an 
ancillary element of the case.70 A similar approach was followed by the CJEU in the 
collaborative economy cases to decide whether the sharing platform should be 
qualified as an information society service or as a provider of the intermediated 
service (such as transport for Uber or hosting for Airbnb).71 
4. Recommendations for interplay between NCT and sector-specific 
regulation 
4.1. Systemic relationship: Scope of the NCT  
It was explained above that the EU approach to economic regulation sees the various 
regimes – general and sector-specific – as complements rather than substitutes. 
Hence, we recommend that the NCT should apply across the board to all 
economic sectors, including to sectors which might be subject to specific 
regulation.72 This corresponds to options 1 or 3 of the Inception Impact Assessment. 
The presence of overlaps is a logical consequence thereof; to borrow from computer 
science, it is not a bug, it is a feature. 
Indeed, the application of the NCT in a regulated sector may be justified and useful to 
remedy a Structural Competition Problem (SCP) that either cannot trigger regulatory 
intervention or for which available regulatory remedies would offer no effective 
solution. In other words, even if the NCT would be applied in a sector covered by 
specific regulation – electronic communications, energy, transport, financial services, 
                                           
68 EECC, Art. 1(3). 
69 Joined Cases C–54/17 and C–55/17, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)  v Wind 
Tre and Vodafone Italia, ECLI:EU:C:2018:710, para.60 noting that: ‘the term ‘conflict’ refers to the 
relationship between the provisions in question which goes beyond a mere disparity or simple difference, 
showing a divergence which cannot be overcome by a unifying formula enabling both situations to exist 
alongside each other without the need to bring them to an end.’ 
70 Case C-518/11, UPC Nederland v. Hilversum, ECLI:EU:C:2013:709.  
71 Case C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain ECLI:EU:C:2017:981, para.40 ; 
Case C-320/16, Uber France ECLI:EU:C:2018:221, para.22 deciding that: “that the intermediation service 
(provided by Uber) had to be regarded as forming an integral part of an overall service the main component 
of which was a transport service and, accordingly, had to be classified, not as an ‘information society 
service’ (…) but as a ‘service in the field of transport’ (…)”; Case C-390/18, Airbnb Ireland 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1112, para.69. 







etc. – that regulation may suffer from a “regulatory gap”, i.e. the inability to deal 
with a SCP. By way of illustration of such a “gap”, one could think of the tight 
oligopoly structure that appears to be prevailing in electronic communications 
markets, as evidenced in a number of merger control assessments.73 In December 
2015, at the beginning of the last reform of the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, BEREC pointed to the insufficiency of the (then) Directives to 
intervene in case of tight oligopolies and suggested to change in the law to broaden 
the possibilities of intervention.74 However, the EU institutions did not adopt all the 
changes proposed by BEREC and, in doing so, may have left a regulatory gap which 
could be usefully closed by the NCT.75  
A gap could also arise because an SCP occurs so infrequently that regulatory 
intervention for such SCP has been deemed too costly for the benefits it would bring. 
These costs include the cost of carrying out the intervention (inquiry, proceedings, 
decision), the cost of maintaining, enforcing and reviewing regulation, and of course 
the compliance costs and disincentives visited on market actors. Depending on how it 
is conceived and operated, the NCT could be less costly to use than sector-specific 
regulation. Finally, a gap could also arise as a matter of regulatory dynamics: the SCP 
in question could be a new occurrence that has not yet been acknowledged and 
identified by sector-specific regulation. Conceivably, experience could have been 
gained under the NCT in dealing with such a SCP in other sectors, in which case the 
NCT could offer a comparative advantage over sector-specific regulation. 
It has also been suggested that the NCT could be useful to intervene in situations 
where a SCP could be addressed by sector-specific regulation but has not been 
remedied because of failure on the part of the NRA. For instance, the NRA may fail to 
successfully defend its decision on appeal, for reasons that are independent of its 
control,76 the NRA may apply sector regulation in an incorrect manner and make 
mistakes77 or the NRA may be captured.78 In the jurisdictions that already have a 
                                           
73 Such tight oligopoly is a result of concentration on mobile communications markets (given the limited 
number of spectrum licenses), coupled with the relative transparency of the market and extensive 
infrastructure sharing. See for instance General Court, Case T-399/16, CK Telecoms UK Investments  v. 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2020:217, where the oligopolistic state of the UK mobile communications market is 
discussed at length, against the backdrop of EMCR case-law making comparable findings in other national 
markets. As for fixed communications markets, in most Member States they are at best duopolies. 
74 BEREC Opinion of 15 December 2015 on the Review of the EU Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Framework, BoR(15) 206, p. 14 noting that: “NRAs should be able to address duopoly scenarios – e.g. 
where NRAs are unable to find a single SMP operator in the relevant market but where two players are 
nonetheless not effectively competing. This is especially relevant, for example in the market for internet 
access, where the duopoly situations (with only two infrastructure-based competitors) is more likely to 
develop. As described in BEREC’s report on oligopolies, duopolistic/oligopolistic communications markets 
face a high risk of evolving in a non-competitive manner and are less likely to support efficient and 
sustainable competition (“two are not enough”). BEREC’s report on oligopoly analysis and regulation has 
identified several possible options for adapting the Framework regarding the regulatory treatment of 
oligopolies, including potential market indicators of non-competitive oligopolies.”; BEREC Report of 15 
December 2015 on oligopoly analysis and regulation, BoR(15) 195. 
75 All the more since the General Court in Case T-399/16 CK Telecoms, supra, severely restricted the 
applicability of the MCR to mergers involving such markets.  
76 See the example of termination rates in the Netherlands, leading up to Case C-28/15 KPN v. ACM, supra, 
where the Dutch NRA duly applied EU law only to see its decision vacated on appeal. The reasons given by 
the court of appeal were severely criticized by the CJEU in its judgment at para. 42, with reference to the 
opinion of the Advocate-General for more detail.  
77 This has been used to justify the Commission decision in Deutsche Telekom, supra: see Geradin (2004) 
contra Larouche (2009). As discussed above, this is not how the CJEU explained the case: Case C-208/08P, 
Deutsche Telekom, supra. On the use of competition law actions to correct intervention of NRAs, see also de 
Streel (2014). 




functional equivalent to the NCT, the tool has sometimes been used to correct the 
inaction of the regulators.  
However, the EU context is different from these national jurisdictions. We would 
recommend against any suggestion that the NCT is the relevant means to correct the 
(in)action of an incompetent or captured NRA. There are other legal means to do that, 
in particular the specific coordination mechanisms set up by the sectoral regulation in 
question79 or, in last resort, an infringement procedure against the Member State of 
the NRA in question under Article 258 TFEU. It would be detrimental to the integrity of 
both the NCT and other economic regulation regimes if the NCT was seen as an 
additional means of recourse in regulatory proceedings. The existence of a regulatory 
gap should not depend on the quality of NRA enforcement activities, but rather on the 
inability of the regulatory regime to deal with a SCP in the abstract. Therefore, as it 
will be suggested below, if the NCT investigation concludes that the obligations 
necessary to remedy the SCP could in fact be imposed under existing regulation 
(hence, there is no regulatory gap at the end of the day), then it would be better to 
solve the SCP with existing sector regulation. To do so, the Commission, in its quality 
as NCT enforcer, could make recommendations to the authorities, often national, in 
charge of sectoral regulation. 
An additional argument in favour of a horizontal scope for the NCT is that it will 
alleviate uncertainty and costly litigation on the precise scope of the NCT. The 
risks and costs of a sectoral scope instead of a horizontal scope could be illustrated by 
the constant frustration, in the longstanding process of ICT convergence, with the 
attempts to neatly delineate the respective ambits of sector-specific regulatory 
regimes through definitions. Intense negotiations have produced a complex 
definitional scheme involving “electronic communications” networks and services, to 
be distinguished from “Information Society services” and from “audiovisual media 
services” (themselves divided in both linear and non-linear subcategories).80 The 
resulting pigeonholing exercise is profoundly at odds with the technological and 
economic reality of the ICT sector.81  
It is also interesting to note that in the other jurisdictions which have an NCT 
equivalent, this tool has a horizontal scope and has indeed been applied in 
regulated sectors. In the UK, the CMA may launch a market investigation in any 
sector of the economy, including regulated sectors, as no sector is legally excluded 
from Part 4 of the Enterprise Act. The sectoral regulators may themselves make 
market investigation references for which the investigation will be conducted by the 
CMA. They will do so when it would be more appropriate to deal with a competition 
problem through a market investigation than under sectoral regulation.82 In this 
                                                                                                                               
78 There are few actual cases where regulatory capture was at stake, even though by all accounts capture is 
not unheard of in the EU. A more striking case of legislative capture occurred in the case of the regulation of 
New General Network in Germany: Case C-424/07 Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2009:749. 
79 For instance, Art. 32-34 EECC. 
80 Those respective definitions are now included in: EECC, Art. 2; Directive 2015/1535 laying down a 
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on 
Information Society services, OJ [2015] L 241/1, art.1; Directive 2010/13 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision 
of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ [2010] L 95/1, as amended by 
Directive 2018/1808, art. 1(1). 
81 See for instance Case C-518/11, UPC Nederland v. Hilversum. 
82 Market investigation references: Guidance about the making of references under Part 4 of the Enterprise 







regard, Whish (2020) indicates that 4 of the 20 market investigation references so far 
came from sectoral regulators.83 Next to the market investigations done in regulated 
sectors at the request of the regulators, other investigations have been done in 
regulated sectors at the CMA’s own initiative.84  
Similarly, in South Africa, all the provisions of the Competition Act, including the 
market inquiries, apply to regulated sectors.85 In practice, some market inquiries have 
been completed in regulated sectors such as the Banking Inquiry in 2008 and the 
Mobile Data Services in 2019.86 This is also the case in Mexico where market 
examinations have been launched in regulated sectors such as transport or credit card 
payment systems.87 
4.2. Substantive relationship 
The NCT will fit into the broader landscape of EU economic regulation: as the paper by 
Motta and Peitz (2020) underlines, the NCT can rest on solid economic analysis, 
as do the other regulatory regimes. In the light of the experience with electronic 
communications regulation, however, we would like to emphasize that, even as 
regards the relationship with traditional competition law, there is no significant 
advantage to be gained by placing the economic inquiry to be carried out under the 
NCT within the straitjacket of competition law analysis (i.e. relevant market definition, 
followed by an assessment of whether the relevant market as defined – or the firms 
that populate it – meets certain criteria). 
In particular, relevant market definition can introduce an element of rigidity that might 
impair the effectiveness of the NCT: it results in a snapshot view of markets, and the 
EU practice tends to be to define narrow markets. Competitive phenomena that might 
occur outside of or beyond the relevant market(s) have proven difficult to introduce 
into the analysis at the market assessment stage.88  This is all the more critical if the 
NCT aims to deal with SCP in dynamic markets, where part of the competitive game 
involves reshaping markets through disruptive innovation, for instance.89 Even if 
breaking with the standard formula of competition law analysis might perhaps wrongly 
create the impression that the NCT does not belong within competition law, the very 
rationale for the NCT is to bridge gaps in the coverage of competition law, some of 
which arise as a consequence of rigidities induced by relevant market definition.90  
                                           
83 Those were: (i) the Office of Rail and Road made a reference of Rolling Stock Leasing in April 2007 and 
the Competition Commission reported in April 2009 (ii) OFCOM made a reference of Movies on Pay TV in 
August 2010 and the Competition Commission reported in August 2012; (iii) OFGEM referred Energy in June 
2014 and the CMA reported in June 2016; (iv) the Financial Conduct Authority referred Investment 
Consultants in September 2017 and the CMA reported in December 2018. Moreover, in one other case in 
2005, OFCOM accepted undertakings from BT in lieu of a market investigation reference 
84 This was the case of the market investigations in retail banking or in investment consultants. 




88 By way of example, see how the relevant market definition exercise prevents the Commission from 
perceiving what is truly at stake in Facebook/WhatsApp, namely the acquisition of one of the most likely 
springboards for disruptive innovation by the very powerful platform: Decision of 3 October 2014, Case 
M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp. See also LEAR (2019) and Fletcher (2020) cautioning against the reliance on 
rigid market definition in the digital sectors.  
89 Larouche (2020). 
90 In that respect, one could argue that the NCT would merely follow the trend already underway in merger 
control, where the horizontal guidelines in both the US and the EU put forward analytical methods that 




What is truly important for the NCT to fit within the broader landscape of EU economic 
regulation, we would suggest, is a clear commitment to the theoretical and 
methodological foundations of EU economic regulation. In other words, the NCT should 
be solidly anchored in economics. Instead of insisting on the analytical structure of 
competition law, it is preferrable to invest time and resources to ensure that the 
rationale for the NCT is well developed, and that the provisions of the NCT legislation 
properly render or translate the underlying economics. In all likelihood, this will mean 
that the NCT is formulated in more precise terms than current competition law (which 
relies on general notions such as “agreement”, “restriction of competition”, “abuse” 
and “dominant position”). A more precise formulation would also reduce the need to 
use concepts such as market definition in order to put boundaries on the discretion of 
the authority. We would also suggest that the NCT contains devices designed to foster 
sound economic analysis, such as a requirement that a cogent theory of harm be 
formulated, tying all the economic features into a coherent analysis. 91 This implies 
that the NCT should be based on structural problems and not on the finding of a 
dominant position. This corresponds to the options 3 and 4 of the Inception Impact 
Assessment. 
Furthermore, the experience with sectoral regulation also leads us to emphasize the 
significance of technological neutrality, and with it the use of economic or 
functional concepts in the design of the NCT.92 Technological neutrality is especially 
important if the NCT is to apply across the board to all economic sectors as suggested 
above. 
Finally, also in the light of the experience with sectoral regulation, we would caution 
against too great a reliance on soft-law instruments for the substantive 
development of the NCT and its coordination with other regulatory regimes. If the 
NCT is intended to be enforced by the Commission alone, these soft-law instruments 
will bind the Commission, as recognised by case-law. Nevertheless, some soft-law 
instruments could be used to set out the relationship between the NCT and other 
economic regulation regimes, and hence between the respective authorities. In certain 
cases, case-law indicates that a “comply or explain” effect can be achieved, but only 
with the use of recommendations or with the addition of an obligation to “take utmost 
account” of the instrument. In our view, informed by the experience of the last 20 
years, it is preferrable to try to lay down the fundamentals of the NCT 
substance and of its relationship with other regimes in the NCT legislation 
itself, even if it requires a greater expense of time and resources during the 
legislative process. Soft-law instruments can be used later to build and elaborate on 
these existing fundamentals, without running any risk for the validity and legal force 
of these fundamentals. 
4.3. Institutional relationship  
(a) Vertical cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs 
Considering the number of regimes making up EU economic regulation, we think that, 
at the institutional level, the NCT should not be set up as yet another stand-alone 
                                                                                                                               
reduce the need for market definition to carry out a conclusive assessment in cases of monopolistic 
competition (markets with significant product differentiation amongst competitors). 
91 This is also the direction suggested by Motta and Peitz (2020). 







regime, an institutional island whose authorities need to coordinate and cooperate 
with those in charge of every other regime. Since the NCT is closely linked with EU 
competition law, we would recommend that its institutional structure be 
embedded within that of competition law, in particular that of Regulation 1/2003. 
After all, the NCT is likely to be applied by the Commission or the NCAs or both. It 
would stand to reason that the mechanisms of Regulation 1/2003 would then be used 
to achieve coordination and cooperation with the authorities applying competition 
law.93 
In concrete terms, this would mean that a round of consultation within the ECN would 
be undertaken every time the Commission (or an NCA) proposes to launch an 
investigation under the NCT. 94 This would allow for a discussion, within the ECN, of 
whether the use of the NCT – as opposed to standard competition tools (Articles 101 
or 102 TFEU) – is appropriate, and of which authority is best placed to investigate. 
Similarly, at the end of the investigation, the proposed measure could be circulated for 
consultation within the ECN95 or the Advisory Committee,96 depending on whether an 
NCA or the Commission led the investigation. Relying on the tried-and-true 
mechanisms of Regulation 1/2003 for institutional coordination between the NCT and 
the rest of competition law would be an effective and efficient choice. 
(b) Transversal cooperation between the Commission and the NRAs 
As the authorities in charge of sector-specific regulation are often national,97 
transversal cooperation between the Commission and the NRAs would be 
needed when the NCT is applied in sectors subject to specific regulation.98 In the 
different countries having an equivalent to the NCT, cooperation between the NCA and 
the NRA is often foreseen for all the tasks of the authorities, including the enforcement 
of the NCT equivalent.99 This is the case for instance in Greece,100 or in South 
Africa.101 
At the beginning stage, an NCT inquiry could be launched ex officio or upon a 
complaint. There are pros and cons as to whether NRAs should be able to lodge a 
complaint under the NCT with the competent authority.  On the one hand, NRAs are 
ideally placed to identify regulatory gaps in the sectors that they scrutinize. Indeed, in 
the UK, sectoral regulators can make a reference to the CMA for a market 
investigation. On the other hand, as we set out above, the integrity of both the NCT 
and sector-specific regulation would be prejudiced if the NCT could be used as an 
additional battlefield for sector-specific regulation. Accordingly, NCT legislation should 
clearly define the circumstances under which an NRA can lodge a complaint: there 
must be a regulatory gap, i.e. a situation where the NRA either has no competence to 
                                           
93 This is in line with the analysis put forward by Schweizer (2020). 
94 In line with Regulation 1/2003, Art. 11(2) and (3). 
95 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 11(4). 
96 Article 14(1) of Regulation 1/2003. 
97 There are some notable exception like the supervision of the systemic done by the EU Single Supervisory 
Mechanism. 
98 The possible NCT stages are described in Schweitzer (2020; p. 17 et sq). 
99 Generally, on the relationships between NCA and NRA, see OECD (1999) et (2005). 
100 Article 24 of the Greek Law 3959 of 2011 on the Protection of Free Competition. 
101 Article 82 of the South African Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 as amended. On that basis, the 
Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) has concluded several Memoranda of Understanding with 
sector regulators: http://www.compcom.co.za/mou/ 




intervene or no adequate remedy at its disposal, in the abstract, even if it discharged 
its functions in the best possible fashion.  
During the enquiry and the information gathering process about possible SCP in a 
regulated sector, the Commission should consult the relevant NRA(s). The Commission 
should also be able to receive confidential information from those NRAs, provided it 
ensures the same level of confidentiality as the NRA which gathered the 
information.102 Such exchange of information should be foreseen in the law and 
possibly organised through cooperation agreements between the Commission and the 
NRAs.103 The same principles may apply to the sharing of information in the other 
direction, i.e. information gathered in the course of investigating under the NCT being 
shared with an NRA. 
The identification of the market features and the SCP justifying the imposition of 
remedies under the NCT should be done, in a regulated sector, in close cooperation 
with the relevant NRAs and/or the EU-level forum regrouping those NRAs (for 
instance, BEREC for electronic communications, ACER for energy, the ESAs for the 
financial). In that regard, the NCT legislation could require the Commission to consult 
the relevant NRA(s) and that EU-level forum before issuing a decision on the SCP. 104 
The NCT legislation could also enable the relevant EU-level forum, if any, to issue a 
non-binding opinion on the Commission draft decision, thereby extending the advisory 
power of those fora to Commission action under the NCT.105 In the light of the 
discussion above, we would advise putting the Commission under a requirement to 
“take utmost account” of the NRA or EU-level forum opinion, in order to add credibility 
to the consultation process. With such a requirement, the Commission is bound either 
to follow the opinion or to provide explanations as to why it is not appropriate to 
follow that opinion, in the view of the Commission. 
However, we do not think that there is a need to go any further than cooperation and 
consultation. In particular, we do not see why, as some have suggested, the NCT 
should be implemented by the NRAs themselves when applied in a regulated sector.106 
If the NCT forms part of the EU competition law regime, as envisaged, then NRAs 
might not be suited to carry out an NCT investigation.107 Moreover, in the context of a 
new regime like the NCT, enforcement should be in the hands of the same authority 
irrespective of the sector where it is applied. It took almost 40 years of experience 
under EU competition law before the law was thought to be sufficiently well developed 
for Regulation 1/2003 to introduce fully decentralised application by national 
                                           
102 A similar provision to exchange information between NCA and NRA is included in the EECC, Art. 11. Such 
sharing of information should comply with the fundamental principles of procedural fairness guaranteed by 
Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. To do so, Schweitzer (2020) explains that two 
conditions must be met: “(i) the transfer of information must be provided for by law; and (ii) the 
information transferred must not have been obtained under an investigatory regime [here the sectoral 
regulatory regime] that provides for a lower degree of procedural protection than the one that is applicable 
in the context in which the information shall be used after the transfer [here the NCT regime]”. 
103 Cooperation agreements between NCA and NRA often contain provisions on information sharing between 
agencies. 
104 Such cooperation is also foreseen between the NCA and the regulatory authority in Mexico: Article 94(III) 
of the Mexican Federal Economic Competition Law of 2014. 
105 For instance, the current advisory powers of BEREC are listed in Regulation 2018/1971, Art. 4(1), esp. 
4(1)(b). 
106 This has been suggested by BEREC in its Response to the Public Consultation on the DSA and the NCT, 
p.37.  
107 Except maybe in Member States where the relevant NRA is merged with the NCA in a super-authority 
(e.g. Netherlands or Spain for network industries), but there the super-authority in its quality as NCA would 







competition authorities without fear of fragmentation. If any national authority should 
get the power to apply the NCT, it should be the NCA, and then only in the medium to 
long term, provided it has sufficient resources for these tasks.  
At the remedial stage, if a SCP has been identified in a regulated sector, then the 
Commission should design the remedies in close cooperation with the relevant NRAs. 
This is all the more justified since, in designing the remedies, the Commission would 
be well advised to take into account the different objectives the NRAs might be 
pursuing. Inspiration may be taken from the UK system where the CMA should take 
into account the various objectives of sectoral regulation when designing the remedies 
in a market investigation.108 As explained by Whish and Bailey (2018: Chapter 11), 
“those remedies may go beyond preventing adverse effects on competition: for 
example there is a legal obligation to ensure the maintenance of a universal postal 
service.” 
The implementation of the remedies depends on the competence of the NRAs: 
- If the NRAs have the competence - under their national law transposing EU law 
or directly under EU law - to remedy the SCP, then there is no regulatory gap 
at the end of the day. In such a case, the Commission could issue a 
recommendation to the NRAs to implement the designated remedies under 
their respective sectoral framework, with a requirement to take utmost account 
of the Commission recommendation. This case is perhaps unlikely, but not 
impossible: it is conceivable that, at the end of a long NCT investigation, the 
additional information and knowledge gained through the investigation leads to 
a different conclusion than what was expected earlier. What seemed like a 
regulatory gap, on the basis of the information available at the outset of the 
investigation, could turn out to be actually solvable with the existing array of 
regulatory remedies. Our suggested approach would be similar to the Mexican 
system where the NCA could notify to the NRA the finding of barriers to 
competition and free market access for it to determine, within the scope of its 
jurisdiction and according to the procedures in prevailing legislation, what 
actions should be taken to achieve competition conditions.109 
- If the NRAs do not have the competence to remedy the SCP (hence, there is 
truly a regulatory gap), then the Commission should be able to impose 
appropriate remedies, thereby ensuring that the NCT usefully complements 
sector regulation. 
Finally, the monitoring and the control of compliance with NCT remedies in a regulated 
sector could be delegated by the Commission to the NRA. In this case, the NRA should 
regularly report to the Commission, which would remain in charge of sanctioning any 
failure to comply with the remedies imposed under the NCT.110  
 
 
                                           
108 UK Enterprise Act 2002, s. 168. 
109 Article 95 of the Mexican Federal Economic Competition Law of 2014. 
110 This setting was relied in the merger NewsCorp/Telepiu, Decision of 2 April 2003, Case M.2876, para. 
259. 






Table 3: Transversal cooperation mechanisms between the Commission and 
the NRA 
 
Phase of NCT proceedings 
 
Cooperation Commission - NRA 
1. Initiation NRA reference in proven case of regulatory gap 
2. Information gathering Exchange of confidential information 
3. Identification of Structural 
Competition Problem 
Opinion of NRA or EU-level network 
4. Remedy design Opinion of NRA or EU-level network 
5. Remedy implementation - If NRA can act (hence no gap), recommendation to 
NRA 
- If NRA cannot act, NCT remedy fills regulatory gap 
6. Remedy monitoring Possible delegation to NRA 
 
4.4. Reconciliation mechanism 
Given the extensive cooperation and coordination mechanisms suggested above, there 
should be few cases where divergences between the NCT and specific regulation needs 
to be reconciled.111  
We have explained in the previous section that standard competition law (Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU) prevails over sectoral regulation mainly because of the hierarchy of 
law: competition law is primary EU law and therefore enjoys primacy over sectoral 
regulation, which is secondary law. The NCT will itself not be primary law. Since it will 
potentially have a broader scope than standard competition law (in particular if it is 
structure-based, as in options 3 and 4 of the Inception Impact Assessment), it may 
even not be considered as an implementation of primary EU competition law like 
Regulation 1/2003 or, to some extent, the MCR.112 Thus, an argument based on the 
hierarchy of law is more difficult to make.  
As a starting point, we would be against an absolute hierarchical rule based on “fields” 
or “competences”, without any regard for the concrete implementation and 
enforcement by the respective authorities. To wit, such a rule would state that there is 
a NCT “field” where sector-specific regulation cannot thread, irrespective of what has 
been done under the NCT, or vice-versa. Indeed, absolute NCT primacy over sectoral 
regulation would lead to difficulties when the two legal regimes have different 
objectives, e.g. to remedy different market failures, which is often the case.  
Conversely, sector-specific regulation should not either prevail over the NCT as an 
absolute rule. Some favour such a solution because sectoral regulation would be a lex 
specialis in relation to the more general NCT, applicable across the board to the whole 
economy.113 Even if this argument could apply in a horizontal relationship (between 
                                           
111 Coordination between the NCT and current competition law is discussed in Schweitzer (2020). 
112 The legal basis of the NCT may also play a role in this assessment. If the NCT is based not only on Art. 
103 TFEU, but also on another legal basis such as Art. 114 TFEU (as suggested in the Inception Impact 
Assessment) or Art. 352 TFEU (as it is the case for the Merger Regulation), then the direct link with EU 
primary law (Art. 101 and 102 TFEU) will be loosened. 







two national regimes or two EU regimes), it is less convincing in a transversal situation 
pitting EU law enforced at the EU level (the NCT) against another EU legal regime, 
often a Directive, applied at the national level (sectoral regulation). In such a 
situation, a primacy rule in favour of sectoral regulation risks undermining the internal 
market by fragmenting the effect of the NCT. 
We would accordingly propose a much narrower rule, based not on abstract notions of 
“fields”, but on the concrete actions of the respective authorities. As a starting point, 
both the NCT and sector-specific regulation should apply concurrently, unless 
their concurrent application puts a firm in a situation where it cannot comply 
with both regimes at the same time. Such cases should be exceptional. There 
would thus be no need for reconciliation if, under one regime, a firm is put under a 
regulatory obligation, whereas under the other regime, regulatory analysis led the firm 
to be exempted from any obligation.114 In such a situation, the firm can comply with 
both regimes. To the extent that the two regimes are complementary, there should 
not be any significant proportionality issue, since the respective interventions of each 
authority are presumably necessary and proportionate to the aims of the respective 
regimes (NCT and sectoral regulation). In any event, if – as is assumed – the 
application of the NCT in a regulated sector is premised on the existence of a 
regulatory gap, there can be no divergence since sector-specific regulation cannot be 
applied. 
Under such a narrow rule, the emphasis would be on institutional mechanisms for the 
Commission and the NRA to cooperate and coordinate their actions, along the 
lines described above, so as to avoid a situation where the firm is put in an impossible 
bind.  
In spite of the above, should a firm find itself in a position where it cannot comply with 
one regime without breaching the other, then we would suggest the following 
reconciliation rule. Our starting point is that in principle, the NCT will be used to 
impose obligations across the EU. Sector-specific regulation, on the other hand, is 
usually applied at Member State level, with a specific set of obligations for each 
Member State.115 In a case where the scope of the two conflicting regulatory 
obligations is different, then the regulatory obligation applicable across the EU (usually 
coming from the NCT) should prevail, out of concern for the internal market. 
5. Conclusion 
In the end, we conclude that that the proposed NCT could easily be integrated in 
the existing body of EU economic regulation. 
In order to achieve this integration, hereunder are our specific recommendations in 
short order: 
- The NCT should have a horizontal scope and apply across the board to 
the whole economy, including regulated sectors; 
 
- As for the substance of the NCT: 
                                           
114 With the possible exception of a situation where the exemption from any obligation is essential for the 
overall effectiveness of the regulatory instrument in question. 
115 Our reasoning would not necessarily hold if the starting assumptions (NCT applied uniformly across the 
EU, sectoral regulation applied to the specific set of circumstances of a Member State) are not met. 




 the NCT should rest on the same theoretical basis and 
methodology as existing EU economic regulation, without being 
straitjacketed within specific competition law methodology; 
 the NCT should be formulated in technology-neutral terms, i.e. 
using economic or functional concepts; 
 the fundamental elements of the NCT should be set out in legislation, 
and the role of soft-law – if any – should be limited to developing or 
elaborating on these fundamentals; 
 
- As for the institutional framework of the NCT: 
 NCT implementation and enforcement be embedded within the 
institutional framework for coordination under Regulation 
1/2003, to ensure proper coordination with competition authorities; 
 If and when the NCT is applied in regulated sectors, a close 
transversal cooperation should be set in place between the 
Commission (or any authority enforcing the NCT) and the relevant 
NRA(s) (or other regulatory authority) at every stage of the NCT 
implementation: 
 At the initiation stage, NRAs should be able to make an NCT 
reference when they cannot deal with a SCP in their sector 
because of the existence of a regulatory gap, as this term is 
specifically defined in this paper 
 At the information gathering stage, the Commission and NRAs 
should be able to exchange confidential information provided, 
confidentiality is respected at both ends of the exchange; 
 At the SCP identification and remedy design stages, the NRAs 
(and relevant EU-level networks) should be able to issue an 
opinion on draft Commission decisions, and the Commission 
should be bound to take the utmost account of such opinion; 
 At the remedy implementation phase, the Commission should be 
able to impose remedies when the NRAs cannot act. 
However, if the NRAs are able to act (hence there is no 
regulatory gap ultimately), then the Commission should make 
recommendations for action, of which the NRAs should take 
utmost account. 
 At the remedy monitoring stage, the Commission may delegate 
to the NRAs the compliance monitoring as well as the 
evaluation of the remedy.  
 The NCT and sectoral regulation should apply concurrently, 
except in the rare case where a firm would be put in a position where it 
could not comply with one without breaching the other, in which case an 











- Alexiadis P. and C.M. Pereira Neto (2019), Competing Architectures for Regulatory 
and Competition Law Governance, EUI-FRS Energy Research Report 
- Baldwin R., M. Cave, M. Lodge (2012), Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy 
and Practice, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press. 
- Bourreau M. and P. Dogan (2001) “Regulation and innovation in the 
telecommunications industry” 25 Telecommunications Policy 167. 
- Breyer S. (1982), Regulation and Its Reform, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
- Carlton D.W. and R.C. Picker (2007), Antitrust and Regulation, NBER Working Paper 
12902.  
- Crawford G.S., P. Rey and M. Schnitzer (2020), An Economic Evaluation of the EC’s 
Proposed “New Competition Tool”, Report from the Economic Advisory Group on 
Competition Policy. 
- Cseres K. (2009), “Competition and Consumer Policies: Starting Points for Better 
Convergence” ACLE Working Paper 2009-06, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1379322. 
- Dunne N. (2015), Competition Law and Economic Regulation: Making and Managing 
Markets, Cambridge University Press. 
- Freeman J. and J. Rossi (2012), “Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space”, 
125(5) Harvard Law Review 1131 
- Fletcher A. (2020), Market Investigations for Digital Platforms: Panacea or 
Complement?, available at SSRN. 
- Geradin D. (2004), “Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the 
EU learn from the US Supreme Court’s Judgement in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, 
IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?”, Common Market Law Rev. 41(6), 1519-1553. 
- Geradin D. (2006), “Enhancing Competition in the Postal Sector: Can We Do Away 
with Sector-Specific Regulation?”, TILEC Working Paper, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=909008. 
- Hancher L. and P. Larouche (2011), “The coming of age of EU regulation of network 
industries and services of general economic interest”, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, 
eds., The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press. 
- van der Haar I. (2008) The principle of technological neutrality: Connecting EC 
network and content regulation, TILEC, available at https://www.persistent-
identifier.nl/urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3240352. 
- Hellwig M. (2009), “Competition Policy and Sector-specific regulation in network 
industries”, in Vives X. (ed), Competition Policy: Fifty Years on from the Treaty of 
Rome, Oxford University Press. 




- International Competition Network (2004), Working Group on Antitrust Enforcement 
in Regulated Sectors, Report to the Third Annual Conference in Seoul. 
- International Competition Network (2005), Working Group on Antitrust Enforcement 
in Regulated Sectors, Report to the Fourth Annual Conference in Bonn. 
- Larouche P. (2000), Competition Law and Regulation in European 
Telecommunications, Oxford, Hart Publishing. 
- Larouche P. (2002), "A closer look at some assumptions underlying EC regulation of 
electronic communications", Jour. of Network Industries 3, 129-149. 
- Larouche P. (2004) “Coordination of European and Member State Regulatory Policy: 
Horizontal, Vertical and Transversal Aspects” 5 Journal of Network Industries, 277. 
- Larouche P. (2009), “Contrasting Legal Solutions and Comparability of the EU and 
US Experiences”, in F. Levêque and H. Shelanski, eds., Antitrust and Regulation in the 
EU and US: Legal and Economic Perspectives, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, p. 76. 
- Larouche P. (2020), Platforms, Innovation and Competition on the market, CPI 
February 2020. 
- LEAR (2019), Ex-post Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in Digital Markets, 
Study for the Competition and Markets Authority. 
- Monti G. (2020), Attention Intermediaries: Regulatory Options and their Institutional 
Implications, TILEC Discussion Paper 2020-18. 
- Motta M and M. Peitz (2020) Intervention trigger and underlying theories of harm, 
Paper for the European Commission. 
- Newbery D (2004) “Regulation and competition policy: longer-term boundaries” 12 
Utilities Policy 93. 
- OECD (1999), Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities, 
DAFFE/CLP(99)8. 
- OECD (2005), Relationships between Competition Authorities and Sectoral 
Regulators, DAF/COMP/GF(2005)2. 
- OECD (2011), Regulated conduct defence in antitrust cases, DAF/COMP(2011)3. 
- Schweitzer H. (2020), The New Competition Tool: Its institutional set up and 
procedural design, Paper for the European Commission. 
- Shelanski H. (2011), “The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation” 109 
Michigan L. Rev. 638. 
- de Streel A. (2008), A Program for review of the European economic regulation for 
electronic communications, Telecommunications Policy 32, 722-734. 
- de Streel A. (2014), “The Antitrust Activism of the Commission in the 
Telecommunications Sector”, in P. Lowe and M. Marquis (eds), European Competition 







- Viscusi W.K., Harrington J.E. and Shappington D.E. (2018), Economics of Regulation 
and Antitrust, 5th Ed, MIT Press. 
- Whish R. (2020), New Competition Tool: Legal comparative study of existing 
competition tools aimed at addressing structural competition problems, with a 
particular focus on the UK’s market investigation tool, Paper for the European 
Commission. 
- Whish R. and D. Bailey (2018), Competition Law, 9th ed, Oxford University Press. 
doi: 10.2763/521287
KD-01-20-577-EN-N
Competition
